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Why should a country like Germany, with the AfD currently at 12% in Parliament and at
15% in the polls, be worried about a far-right takeover? I hear this a lot since I’ve
published an article in Süddeutsche Zeitung a few weeks ago about how an authoritarian
populist majority could use the gaps in the constitutional setup of Germany to overthrow
the entire constitution without breaking a single law. Oh, come on, people tell me, stop
the scaremongering already, will you? Haven’t we just celebrated the 70th anniversary of
the Grundgesetz and assured each other over and over again how fantastic and stable
and robust our constitution is? How realistic is it to expect such an authoritarian majority
any time soon, anyway? What could such a hypothetical scenario possibly teach us? Why
cross that bridge before we even get to it?
The thing is: the AfD is a competitor for the democratic majority, not in some distant
hypothetical future, but here and now.
A democratic competition for the majority is what keeps society diverse and dynamic and
is both the reason and the condition for democracies being more robust than
authoritarian or even totalitarian systems. But that is only because and to the extent that
the outvoted can afford to be outvoted. For that, it takes a robust constitution. It takes
strong fundamental rights that protect your existential interests from the majority. It
takes strong procedural rules that keep competition for the majority open. It takes
strong, independent courts to enforce these rights, if necessary, against the majority.
But what if one competes for the majority with people who, quite regardless of
majorities or minorities, equate their aims and methods with the "true will of the people"
from the outset? Before one can afford to even enter into a competition with them, one
must be sure that they, should they win, won’t use the power they have gained to turn
their own self-identification with the "will of the people" into a self-fulfilling prophecy and
to forge the constitutional institutions and procedures into tools of their own power.
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ICON-S ITALIAN CHAPTER CONFERENCE
On November 22-23, 2019 the University of
Florence will host the second conference of
ICON-S Italian Chapter. The conference will
feature two plenary sessions and 112 panels. It
will investigate the legal-theoretical, practical,
and institutional challenges posed by
technological developments, and in particular
the implications of digital technologies,
neurosciences, and genomics for contemporary
legal systems. Program here.
This is the reason why I worry about the robustness of the Grundgesetz right now and not
just at some hypothetical point when a AfD majority might appear more realistic (quite
apart from the fact that it would be much too late then, anyway): Most of their political
opponents, including the CDU, praised be the Lord, are very much aware that they
cannot simply treat this party as an ordinary competitor for the majority like everyone
else. They try to deny the AfD access to all sorts of otherwise non-partisan institutions,
which is a most laudable effort per se, of course, but comes at a price: not only they
provide the AfD with constant new occasions to complain how rigged and corrupt the
system is, but also it unravels the web of informal conventions of fairness on which the
formal body of constitutional law rests – all those small concessions of the majority that
make being in the minority endurable and thus contribute to the functionality of
democracy.
The President of the Bundestag, for example
This week I had the pleasure of sitting on a podium with Norbert Lammert, former
President of the Bundestag for many years and currently Chairman of the CDU-
supportive and -supported Konrad Adenauer Foundation. I asked him what he thought
would happen if the AfD became the relatively strongest group in the Bundestag. As
such, according to parliamentary convention, the AfD would be entitled to claim the
presidency of the parliament. Lammert did not hesitate: that, he answered, would be the
end of this convention. It would be completely unthinkable to hand over this eminently
political office to the AfD as long as there is a majority to keep it from them.
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I entirely agree. The President of the Bundestag is, among other things, in charge of
controlling the observance of the rules of the national party financing and metes out
substantial fines against parties who are found in violation (the AfD is currently under
investigation in that respect). The idea that this office would one day be discharged by,
say, Stefan Brandner – that would be completely mad.
To change the rules is one way of resolving the dilemma. Another would be to take a
critical look at the position of the President of Parliament: why is this such a political
office in the first place? And if it is, why on earth is it assigned the task of monitoring
party funding? Maybe that’s just not the optimal way to regulate these things
constitutionally, in such challenging times as these?
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about these developments amongst the international community of practitioners
and scholars.
The Editorial Board is pleased to invite submissions for its first edition of the
Journal of Constitutional Law in the Middle East and North Africa, which will be
published online in March 2020. The Editorial Board warmly welcomes
submissions of papers, in English, on themes related to constitutional law and
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Interested authors are asked to submit their manuscripts to
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I’m not saying that the Grundgesetz could be made totally storm-proof to a point where
the scenario of an AfD majority would entirely lose its terror. That would be utterly naive,
of course. All I’m saying is that there is a correlation between the robustness of the
Constitution and the functioning of competition for the majority. And that to find
answers to the question under what constitutional conditions a hypothetical AfD majority
might be a less frightening scenario than it is now, might be worthwhile effort. Not just
eventually. Right now.
A great opportunity to enter into this debate has been missed this week: On Thursday,
the Federal and State Justice Ministers of Germany discussed a proposal by Hamburg’s
Justice Senator Till Steffen (Greens) under the title "Making the Grundgesetz crisis-proof",
apparently inspired by my "People’s Chancellor" scenario a few weeks ago. At the core of
the proposal was the observation how vulnerable the Federal Constitutional Court would
be in the case of an authoritarian populist majority which could manipulate the setup
and the procedural law of the FCC freely. Steffen suggested two alternative options:
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either transferring large parts of the competence to regulate its internal business to the
Court itself. Or making the two-thirds majority required to elect FCC judges a
constitutional provision which then could only be altered by a two-thirds majority as well.
Particularly the latter solution enjoys little sympathy in Karlsruhe itself, so far, because of
well-grounded fears of blocking minorities, which may have played a prominent role for
the Justice Ministers as well. There are, however, other solutions apart from the ones put
forward by Steffen, such as making amendments to the Federal Constitutional Court Act
dependent on the agreement of the court (which is, after all, a Verfassungsorgan). Either
way, I would be glad if there were at least a tableau of the different options with their
respective advantages and disadvantages.
Steffen’s colleagues, however, had no desire to let any crisis scenario disturb their
celebratory mood in this year of the 70th anniversary of the wonderful Grundgesetz and
the 30th of the fall of the Berlin Wall, and instead contented themselves with a solemn
declaration about the Grundgesetz being the guarantor for our free democracy etc. on
which any further word would be wasted.
Well, well.
We’ll see.
Unbearable
Speaking of Stefan Brandner: this unspeakable man is currently the chairman of the
Legal Committee of the German Bundestag, an appointment he owes to the usual
consensual package deal between parliamentary groups. No more consensus now,
however: The other parliamentary groups have agreed to relieve Brandner of that office.
Any legal qualms they had have been dissolved by CHRISTOPH SCHÖNBERGER who
claims that the problem is not legal but political: Of course the majority can unseat
Brandner at any time if it so wishes. The downside, though, is clear: there goes another
constitutional convention in favour of the minority.
In Germany, the constitutional event of this week was undoubtedly the decision of the
Federal Constitutional Court on sanctioning unemployed people who don’t cooperate
the way the agency expects them to. Social security must cover the minimum of
existence as a matter of human dignity, according to the FCC’s previous case law, so how
can this minimum be further reduced as a sanction? ALEXANDER THIELE reads this
week’s decision as a piece of "apertistic liberalism" that opens the door to a
proportionality test of human dignity infringements. MATHIAS HONG disagrees.
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Award Ceremony Max Planck-Cambridge Prize for International Law
(MaxCamPIL) on 15 November
The Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law of
Heidelberg and the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law at the University of
Cambridge are delighted to announce that the inaugural Max Planck-Cambridge
Prize for International Law (MaxCamPIL) has been awarded to Nico Krisch
(Graduate Institute for International and Development Studies). Nico Krisch will
receive the Prize at a ceremony to be held in Heidelberg on 15 November 2019.
Further information here.
In Brazil, the right-wing extremist son of the right-wing extremist president is taken to
court for his praise of the torture regime of the military dictatorship in the 1960s. The
president’s allies are already concocting a "court packing scheme" for the Supreme
Court. EMILIO PELUSO NEDER MEYER, THOMAS BUSTAMANTE and MARCELO CATTONI
tell what is going on.
Citizens have been protesting in Lebanon for weeks, with remarkable stamina and
success. ROBERT POLL examines how the rebellion affects the constitutional balance in
the multi-religious state and whether it could eventually turn into a revolution.
Protests are also taking place in Chile, too, and there is tremendously much at stake, as
well. SERGIO VERDUGO warns against placing too much hope in a constitutional renewal
of the country.
The United Kingdom, a far-too-little-known fact, is not just Greater England but consists
of four distinct nations, one of which, Scotland, voted 62% against Brexit and now will
have to leave against its will nonetheless. SIONAIDH DOUGLAS-SCOTT explains how this
will affect the prospects for a second independence referendum for Scotland.
What is also often overlooked is the impact of Brexit on Romanian and Bulgarian
workers in the UK. RALUCA BEJAN reminds both the British government and the EU of
their responsibilities towards this already marginalised group.
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In Germany, the government wants to speed up administrative approval procedures for
infrastructure projects at the expense of legal protection of citizens. THOMAS GROSS
shows that this is in conflict with constitutional and European law.
Elsewhere
DIRK VOORHOOF and RONAN Ó FATAIGH are celebrating a ECtHR judgment according to
which Hungary violates journalist’s freedom of expression by denying them access to
the notorious "reception centres" for refugees.
FRANK DECKER calls for a competition of ideas to find new ways to democratize the EU
after the failure of the spitzenkandidaten process in the election of the Commission
President.
AZZA REKIK, after the election of constitutional law professor Kaïs Saïed as President of
Tunisia, expects the state structure to become more presidential.
ANNA WÓJCIK summarises the latest ECJ ruling in the case of forced retirement of Polish
judges.
ALICIA LISSIDINI reports disturbing tendencies in Uruguay, Latin America’s model
democracy to date.
ALAN RENWICK, MEG RUSSELL and LISA JAMES  answer five key questions about a new
Brexit referendum in the UK.
ISRAA SABER examines the prospects for democratization in Sudan.
That’s it for this week. Stay safe, and if you haven’t already supported us on Steady, you
are as always warmly encouraged to do so without further procrastination.
All best,
Max Steinbeis
P.S. ahemm, sorry to be a pest, but you know, without further procrastination means,
like: right now. You won’t do it at some later, more convenient time. You just won’t.
Believe me.
7/8
While you are here…
If you enjoyed reading this post – would you consider supporting our work? Just click
here. Thanks!
All the best, Max Steinbeis
SUGGESTED CITATION  Steinbeis, Maximilian: Competitors for the Majority, VerfBlog,
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